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Anger has been shown to be a motivating factor in aggression and it is widely accepted that driving anger
may lead to aggressive driving. However, the link between anger and aggressive driving is likely to be
mediated by drivers’ pre-existing cognitive biases and the subsequent situational evaluations made. This
study investigated the extent to which optimism bias, illusion of control beliefs and driver anger predict
self-reported hostile driving behaviours. A total of 220 licensed drivers (106 men; 114 women) com-
pleted a self-report questionnaire measuring trait driving anger, optimism bias, illusion of control and
driving behaviour. Structural Equation Modelling showed that trait driving anger and illusion of control
beliefs account for 37% of the variance in hostile driving behaviour scores. Optimism biases were
unrelated to hostile driving behaviours. Thus, driving anger propensities and feelings of control over
the situation, but not a general tendency to underestimate the likelihood of adverse outcomes, predict
aggressive driving.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Cognitive evaluations and emotion
The inﬂuence of emotion on behaviour is often mediated by
cognitive evaluations. For example, Lerner and Keltner’s (2001)
appraisal theory suggests that individuals predisposed to anger
are more optimistic about risk. This is particularly evident when
risk assessments are compared between self-evaluation of own
risk likelihood and that of others. Lerner and Keltner stipulate that
the key appraisal tendencies for individuals prone to anger are a
sense of individual control over the situation and certainty over
the outcomes. They have shown that angry disposition or trait
anger is positively related to optimism and it relates to risky
choices. Recently, Pietruska and Armony (2013) also demonstrated
a relationship between trait anger and optimism, but were unable
to link optimism directly to risk behaviour.
Other well-regarded affective-cognitive-behavioural theories
have shown expressions of state anger are mediated by apprais-
als that include assessments of risk (Berkowitz, 1990; Lazarus,
1991). For example, Berkowitz’s (1990) cognitive neoassociation
model suggests that anger becomes aggression after assessmentsof illegitimate goal impediments have been met and are coupled
with an individual’s belief that they can control the outcome of
their reaction. Lazarus (1991) also suggests that the secondary
appraisal process, which mediates the experiences and
expression of emotion, involves assessments of an individual’s
ability to cope with the situation and expectations about the
outcome.
Arguably, biases in the cognitive appraisals relating to control
or risk and optimism about the outcome, are likely to exacerbate
the inﬂuence of anger on aggression. For example, both optimism
bias (Weinstein, 1980) and illusion of control (Langer, 1975) are
biases that have been empirically linked to poorer judgments
and increased risk-taking behaviour. Optimism bias is a ten-
dency to overestimate the probability of positive events and
underestimate the likelihood of negative events occurring to
oneself. This can be an adaptive measure that reduces anxiety
(Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Klein, 1995). Illusion of control
beliefs are deﬁned as the tendency to view chances for success
as higher than the probability warrants (Langer, 1975). Individu-
als with high illusion of control beliefs tend to falsely attribute a
chance outcome to their own skill. Both optimism bias and illu-
sion of control have been widely used in psychological research,
and both have been found to predict risky behaviour particularly
in health (Weinstein, 1980) and gambling (Moore & Ohtsuka,
1997, 1999a, 1999b; Ohtsuka, 2013; Ohtsuka & Ohtsuka,
2010).
A.N. Stephens, K. Ohtsuka / Personality and Individual Differences 68 (2014) 124–129 1251.2. Optimism bias, illusion of control and aggressive driving
Optimism bias and illusion of control beliefs have also been
identiﬁed as factors in risky driving. Risky driving behaviours
include speeding, tailgating and driving under the inﬂuence of
drugs or alcohol (DeJoy, 1989; Hammond & Horswill, 2002;
Harre & Sibley, 2007; Horswill & McKenna, 1999; Shinar, 1998).
As risky driving behaviour is commonly observed in aggressive
driving, biases toward unrealistic optimism and illusory control
beliefs are also likely to predict aggressive driving. Drivers with
optimism bias may be less inclined to fear negative repercussions
of their aggressive driving acts, as they believe they are less likely
than other drivers to experience negative outcomes. Illusion of
control beliefs may also contribute to aggressive driving behaviour
because in a driving context, drivers with higher illusions of con-
trol are likely to (incorrectly) attribute driving successes to their
driving ability (Hammond & Horswill, 2002; Horswill &
McKenna, 1999). Aggressive driving may, at least in part, rely on
incorrect assessments of control. Recently in a self-report study,
Sümer, Özkan, and Lajunen (2006) found positive relationships
between driver overconﬁdence, operationalised by variables
resembling optimism bias and illusion of control, and risky driving
behaviours. However, while the relationship between self-
enhancement and risky driving was clear, it is less clear how these
relate to aggressive driving behaviour.
It is commonly accepted that anger prone drivers are also more
aggressive drivers (Deffenbacher, Oetting, & Lynch, 1994; Stephens
& Sullman, under review; Sullman & Stephens, 2013). Deffenbacher
et al. (1994) propose the trait of ‘driving anger’ which is the extrap-
olation of trait anger into context-speciﬁc driving situations.
Although a link between driving anger and aggressive driving is
indisputable, not all angry drivers will become aggressive drivers.
When other triggers for aggressive driving have been examined,
situational predictors including presence of aggressive stimuli such
as rude bumper stickers or weapons (Turner, Layton, & Simons,
1975), trafﬁc congestion (Hennessy & Wiesenthal, 1999; Shinar,
1998) and status of other vehicles (McGarva & Steiner, 2000;
Stephens & Groeger, 2014) have all been highlighted. However,
each of these rely on some assessment of the situation and it is this
assessment that is likely to lead to reactive behaviour. For example,
Stephens and Groeger (2014) examined Berkowitz’s hostile aggres-
sion theory in a simulated driving environment by subjecting driv-
ers to impediment by slower lead drivers. The impediment was
manipulated in terms of behavioural culpability and status of the
lead driver. They found that impediment by lower status drivers
provoked more anger and aggressive reaction even when these
drivers were not culpable for their actions. Further, noting differ-
ences in anger expression by high anger drivers (Stephens &
Groeger, 2009), cognitive biases, such as those identiﬁed in the
appraisal tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) may deter-
mine the degree to which anger contributes to aggressive driving.
The aim of the current study was to examine the contribution of
driving anger, optimism bias and illusory control beliefs in predict-
ing self-reported aggressive driving behaviour. It was expected
that scores for trait driving anger (Hypothesis 1), Illusion of Control
(Hypothesis 2) and Optimism bias (Hypothesis 3) would predict
self-reported aggressive driving behaviours.2. Method
2.1. Participants
A total of 220 drivers (106 men; 114 women) were recruited
from a community sample in Melbourne, Victoria (n = 182: 99
men, 83 women) and from ﬁrst-year psychology classes at VictoriaUniversity (n = 38; 7 men, 31 women). Participants’ age ranged
from 18 to over 60, with 52% of the sample aged between 18 and
30. The length of holding a license ranged between 1 year and over
30 years, with an even split for years licensed. For example,
approximately 25% of the sample had been driving less than
3 years; approximately 25% had been driving 4–10 years; approxi-
mately 25% had been driving 11–20 years and the remaining 25%
had been driving over 21 years.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Driving anger scale (DAS)
The 14-item DAS was used to provide an overall measure of
driving anger (Deffenbacher et al., 1994). The scale presents 14 dif-
ferent situations and asks participants to rate how angry each sit-
uation would make them feel. Ratings are measured on a ﬁve-point
Likert-type scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). Item scores are
combined to form a total DAS score with higher scores indicating
greater propensities to become angered while driving. The DAS
has demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = .80;
Deffenbacher et al., 1994) and has been found to have good
10 week test–retest reliability (Cronbach’s a = .84; Deffenbacher,
Filetti, Lynch, Dahlen, & Oetting, 2002). The validity of the measure
has been demonstrated through correlations with the Trait Anger
Scale (Deffenbacher et al., 1994; Villieux & Delhomme, 2007).
2.2.2. Optimism bias (OB)
OB was measured with DeJoy’s (1989) 10 scenarios regarding
accident risk. Each short scenario describes a crash-related situa-
tion that may occur while driving. For example, ‘‘losing control of
your vehicle at high speed and crashing into another vehicle’’. Partic-
ipants rate the likelihood of each scenario happening to them
when compared to the average driver. Ratings are on 5-point
Likert-type scale (1 = much higher, 5 = much lower). Higher scores
indicate higher levels of OB. The scale had good internal reliability
in the current study (Cronbach’s a = .82).
2.2.3. Illusion of control beliefs (IoC)
IoC were also measured using DeJoy’s (1989) 10 scenarios of
accident risk. IoC beliefs occur in predominantly chance based sit-
uations, therefore, participants were asked to rate the amount of
control they would have over each scenario. Ratings were on a
5-point Likert-type scale (1 = no control, it’s up to chance, 5 = com-
pletely controllable). Higher scores on the scale indicate stronger
IoC beliefs. The scale had acceptable reliability in the current study
(Cronbach’s a = .66).
2.2.4. Aggressive driving behaviours (ADB)
ADB were measured using 29 scenarios from the hostile behav-
iour continuum of James and Nahl (2000). Participants were asked
to rate on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = never; 5 = always) how
frequently in the past year they had engaged in each driving
behaviour (e.g. ‘‘made obscene gestures at other drivers’’). Factor
analysis on this scale showed two separate factors: hostile aggres-
sive driving behaviour, containing 16 items (Cronbach’s a = .92)
and extreme aggression containing 9 items (Cronbach’s a = .85).
After dropping four items, the ADB scale provides high internal
consistency on hostile aggressive driving behaviour and extreme
aggression.
2.3. Procedure
The study was approved by the University ethics committee.
Participants were recruited by convenience sampling methods.
Prospective participants who had agreed to take part received a
letter of invitation to participate that outlined the purpose of the
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and a pre-paid envelope. Participants were requested to complete
the survey in their own time and return with the consent form via
postal mail. Responses were anonymous. Of 325 surveys distrib-
uted, 220 were returned (a response rate of 68%).3. Results
3.1. Data set preparation
Data were excluded for a scale if 10 percent or more of the items
were missing. If less than 10 percent, then missing items were
replaced with a trimmed mean item score for that scale. Only
one case was excluded for too much missing data on the Optimism
Bias scale.
Prior to analysis, the distribution of each variable was checked
for normality. Skewness and kurtosis of the driving anger scale,
optimism bias scale, illusion of control scale and the hostile aggres-
sion variable were all within the normal range (skewness < 1; kur-
tosis < 1.4 in all cases). The extreme aggression factor was
positively skewed. This is to be expected given the infrequency
of extremely aggressive behaviours. Given the absolute skewness
and kurtosis of this variable, square-root transformations were
performed which resulted in acceptable absolute values
(Skewness < 2; Kurtosis < 7; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995).3.2. Main analysis
The relationships between trait driving anger, illusion of control
beliefs, optimism biases and self-reported hostile aggression and
extreme aggression were analysed using Structural Equation Mod-
elling (SEM). For each latent construct in the structural model,
three composite variables were created using the item-to-
construct parceling method, so that the measurement weighting
across the set of indicators was statistically similar. This method
helped reduce the number of observed variables and was more
appropriate for the sample size (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, &
Widaman, 2002). For the DAS, the three composite variables con-
tained, four, ﬁve and ﬁve items respectively. For IoC and OB scales
composites contained three, three and four items. For the hostile
aggression variable, composites consisted of six, six and four items;
and, for the extreme aggression variable, three, three and two
items were grouped in the three composites.
The SEM was conducted using EQS v 6.1 for windows (Bentler,
2005). Robust Maximum Likelihood (ML) method was used as Mar-
dia’s normalised co-efﬁcient was >5.00, indicating non-normal
multivariate distribution. Goodness of ﬁt indices were taken from
the Robust ML estimates and model ﬁt was evaluated using the
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Squared (S-Bv2), S-Bv2/df index,
adjusted Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Root Mean Square Error
of Approximation (RMSEA). Acceptable model ﬁt is traditionally
indicated by df index <5.00, an adjusted CFI of .90 or greater, an
RMSEA of 0.06 or less and a conﬁdence interval (C.I.) reporting aTable 1
Pearson correlations among variables; means, standard deviation and internal consistency
1 2
1. Trait driving anger a = 0.89
2. Illusion of control .01 a = 0.66
3. Optimism bias .15⁄ .37⁄⁄⁄
4. Hostile aggression .62⁄⁄⁄ .30⁄⁄⁄
5. Extreme aggression .35⁄⁄⁄ .20⁄⁄
M (SD) 2.50 (1.90) 3.35 (0.52)
Notes. ⁄⁄⁄p < .001; ⁄⁄p < .01; ⁄p < .05; a = Cronbach’s Alpha coefﬁcient.90% interval surrounding the RMSEA acceptable level <.05
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993).
3.2.1. Variable means and Intercorrelations
The intercorrelations between driving anger, illusion of control
beliefs, optimism bias and self-reported aggressive behaviours are
listed in Table 1, as are the means, standard deviations and internal
consistency alpha coefﬁcients. The mean driving anger score was
2.50 (1.90) out of a possible ﬁve, indicating that drivers in the sam-
ple had tendencies to become moderately angered while driving.
One sample t-tests conﬁrmed the driving anger scores were signif-
icantly lower (ps < .05) than reported means for drivers in New
Zealand (M = 2.72, SD = .68; Sullman & Stephens, 2013), Turkey
(M = 2.88; SD = .68; Sullman, Stephens, & Kuzu, 2013), England
(M = 2.69; SD = .66) and Ireland (M = 2.92; SD = .64; Stephens and
Sullman, under review).
The means for illusion of control beliefs and optimism bias were
both greater than three, the midpoint on a ﬁve-point scale. Namely,
values greater than three indicate that on average drivers consid-
ered themselves more likely to be able to control a situation
(IoC) or less likely to have negative situations happen to them
(OB) when compared to other drivers. One-sample t-tests con-
ﬁrmed that scores for both optimism bias (t (219) = 18.33,
p < .001) and illusion of control (t (219) = 20.51, p < .001) were
signiﬁcantly greater than 3. Thus, the self assessment of driver cog-
nition indicates the presence of two types of cognitive constructs
(biases) in the sample.
When the intercorrelations between the variables were exam-
ined, the strongest relationship was found between trait driving
anger and self-reported aggressive behaviour. This relationship
conﬁrms that drivers who were more prone to anger while driving
also reported more aggressive expressions of anger. Illusion of
control had no relationship with trait driving anger and shared
moderate, reliable correlations with optimism biases and hostile
aggression.
3.2.2. Modelling self-reported aggressive driving
To understand the extent to which driving anger, illusion of
control and optimism biases predict self reported aggressive
behaviours, data were analysed using SEM. The measurement
model, based on Robust ML estimates, showed good ﬁt to the data:
S-Bv2 (38) = 69.55, p < .01, S-Bv2/df index = 1.83, CFI = .95,
RMSEA = 0.06, (90% C.I. = 0.04–0.08). All factor loadings were statis-
tically signiﬁcant and ranged from 0.62 to 0.98. The largest factor
loading was between the hostile aggression item and overall
aggressive factor. The Rho was 0.92.
The structural model (see Fig. 1) loaded the factors for driving
anger, optimism bias and illusion of control on to the overall
aggression factor. The model produced acceptable goodness of ﬁt
indices with a RMSEA value within the stringent upper limit of
0.07 (Steiger, 2007): S-Bv2 (38) = 75.05, p < .01, S-Bv2/df
index = 1.97, CFI = .95, RMSEA = 0.07, (90% C.I. = 0.04–0.09).
Figure 1 shows that the optimism bias factor was not a
statistically signiﬁcant predictor of self-reported hostile driving.
3 4 5
a = 0.82
.30⁄⁄⁄ a = 0.92
.16⁄ .55⁄⁄⁄ a = 0.85
3.66 (0.54) 0.82 (0.40) 0.25 (0.30)
Fig. 1. Structural Equation Model of self-reported aggressive driving behaviours.
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hostile behaviours and accounted for 37% of the variance in the
hostile behaviour scores. Driving anger shared the largest relation-
ship with hostile driving behaviours. Driving anger and illusion of
control were unrelated.4. Discussion
The aim of the current study was to examine the contribution of
trait driving anger, optimism bias and illusion of control in self-
reported aggressive driving behaviours. A structural model showed
that, as hypothesised, aggressive driving behaviour, comprising
hostile aggressive behaviours (such as making hostile gestures or
slowing down when being tailgated) and more extreme aggression
(getting out of the car to yell at someone) could be predicted by
trait driving anger (Hypothesis 1) and illusion of control beliefs
(Hypothesis 2). Contrary to what was expected, scores for opti-
mism bias (Hypothesis 3) did not signiﬁcantly contribute to the
prediction model of self-reported aggressive driving.
The results offer support for McKenna’s (1993) suggestion that
illusion of control, not optimism bias, is important in assessment of
trafﬁc accident risk. McKenna argued that researchers tend not to
distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable situations
when measuring optimism bias and thus, relationships between
optimism bias and estimates of positive outcomes are confounded
by perceived control. For example, DeJoy (1989) examined opti-
mism biases in risk assessments of drivers and concluded that opti-
mism bias exists because drivers overestimate the control they
have in speciﬁc situations. McKenna addressed this point by mea-
suring safety beliefs for participants when they were imagining
both driving a motor vehicle, and when being driven in a motor
vehicle. He found that optimism biases were only present in situa-
tions where the participants imagined driving, and thus had a sense
of control. In the study of drivers reported above, illusion of control
and optimism bias were moderately correlated suggesting these
constructs are similar, yet still distinct from each other. Both illu-
sion of control and optimism bias scores shared positive correla-
tions with self-reported aggressive driving behaviours in
correlational analysis. However, bivariate correlations do not take
into account the joint effects of these on either anger or aggression.
When considered simultaneously in the structural model, it was
the element of control that contributed toward aggressive driving
behaviour. Thus we speculate that optimism bias is related toperceived positive driving outcomes because, in the driving con-
text, drivers base a part of their judgment on the sense of control
they have over the outcome. This sense of control is likely to result
from underlying perceived skills, which overlap with illusion of
control. Indeed drivers tend to self-enhance their skills compared
to reference drivers (McKenna, 1993).
The study is the ﬁrst to examine optimism bias and illusion of
control beliefs in relation to self-reported aggressive driving
behaviour and the ﬁrst to model the relationship of these with trait
driving anger propensities. The study is also among the ﬁrst to
offer comparisons of driving anger propensities from an Australian
sample with drivers from other countries. Driving anger means
were reliably lower than those reported for drivers from neigh-
bouring countries such as New Zealand (Sullman & Stephens,
2013) or in the Northern hemisphere, such as Turkey (Sullman
et al., 2013), United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland (Stephens
& Sullman, under review). Trait anger scores have been found to
sometimes (Deffenbacher, Lynch, Filetti, Dahlen, & Oetting, 2003),
but not always (Berdoulat, Vavassori, & Sastre, 2013), differ across
gender. However, the current study had a relatively even gender
split and this is similar to the distributions in the studies to which
the means have been compared. One exception is that the Turkish
sample was all men. The age of the current sample had a wide dis-
tribution, although the majority of drivers (53%) were less than
30 years old. The average ages of drivers in the comparative studies
were older (ranging between 35 and 42 years). As driving anger is
also expected to decline with age (e.g. Stephens & Groeger, 2009) it
is unlikely that the differences found in mean scores are due to
average ages in the samples. Thus, although there may be other
contributing factors that were not measured in this study, the
Australian sample reported that they were less prone to driving
anger compared to their counterparts abroad. However, under
the condition with moderate predispositions toward driving anger
in this sample, SEM predicts both mild and extreme forms of driver
aggression.
The results are consistent with previous research demonstrat-
ing relationships between trait anger, perceived control and
aggression (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and extend these ﬁndings by
demonstrating the anger-control-aggression relationships in a
sample of drivers. These relationships are likely to be reciprocal.
For example, expressions of anger are reliant upon an appraisal
process that includes assessments of control (e.g. Lerner &
Keltner, 2001). Feelings of control in turn are likely to trigger anger
(e.g. Berkowitz, 1990). Berkowitz (1990) suggests that anger is
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cause of which is attributed to another person. Participants with
self-enhanced perceptions related to control and by its nature, per-
ceptions of skill, may be more likely to view obstructions as the
result of another driver, and perceive a ‘‘deﬁciency’’ in the other
person’s driving skills. Attributing anger or misattributing blame
is a common error when the driver being blamed is perceived to
be of a lesser status (Stephens & Groeger, 2014). Illusion of control
beliefs may also compensate, or overcompensate, for loss of control
(James & Nahl, 2000). Driving anger often occurs in situations
when progress is impeded (Deffenbacher et al., 1994; Stephens &
Groeger, 2011). In these circumstances perceptions of lost control
are probable. Illusion of control provides a more practical reaction
in a driving situation than learned helplessness. Unfortunately,
illusion of control is no longer adaptive when it culminates in
aggressive driving.
4.1. Study limitations
The study suffers from the usual criticisms relating to the use of
self-report scales that can elicit socially desirable responses. The
driving anger scale and the self-reported driving behaviours are
likely to be the most vulnerable given their sensitive nature.
Although concerns are raised with regard to the inﬂuence of social
desirability on self-report measures (e.g. van Hooft & Born, 2012;
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), the driving anger scale has been exten-
sively tested and has a body of published norms. Strong correla-
tions have been found with state anger (see Deffenbacher et al.,
1994) as well as with dangerous driving behaviours measured in
driving simulators (Deffenbacher et al., 2003) and in real trafﬁc
conditions (Underwood, Chapman, Wright, & Crundall, 1999).
Lajunen and Summala (2003) investigated the inﬂuence of social
desirability on self-reported aberrant driving behaviours and
reported little evidence of socially desirable responses. Further,
Sullman and Taylor (2010) also suggest that the effect of social
desirability bias on self-reported risky driving behaviours is not
necessarily substantial. However, more research using more objec-
tive affective and behavioural measurements is needed to further
explore the issue of illusion of control in driving aggression.
4.2. Implications
The results provide evidence that an illusion of control may
exacerbate the inﬂuence of trait driving anger on aggressive driv-
ing behaviours. While the relationship between anger and aggres-
sive driving is indisputable, not all angry drivers will become
aggressive and not all aggressive drivers will be angry. Thus,
identifying how cognitive biases may inﬂuence driving behaviour,
particularly in situations where arousal is likely to inﬂuence situa-
tional evaluation is an important ﬁrst step in identifying strategies
to reduce these dangerous driving behaviours.
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